The Sam Adams of C. Michael Hiam's book is neither the hero of the American Revolution nor the beer, but Samuel A. Adams , who in his 10-year career as a CIA analyst caused more trouble than any analyst before or since. Sam, a distant relative of his 18th-century namesake, arrived at the Agency in 1963 after a brief spell as a "downwardly mobile WASP" (his term) in the outside world. By his own account, Sam's bosses were calling him "the outstanding analyst" in the Agency after he had been there only three years. 1 In another three years, they were badgering him to resign. His story raises important questions about the relationship between intelligence and policy that persist to this day.
Sam was good-looking, brilliant, endlessly curious and inventive, and a glutton for research. He had a wonderfully self-deprecating sense of humor. He was almost childlike in his eagerness to discover things and share his discoveries with everyone around him. He was also obsessive, stubborn, quixotic, and disheveled to the point of slovenliness. He was incapable of marching to any drummer but his own. Thomas Powers, who edited both Hiam's book and Sam's own memoir ( Sam's first assignment when he arrived at CIA was the Congo, and this is where I got to know him. (I have a cameo role at the beginning of Hiam's book as the nerdy South Africa analyst at the next desk.) Sub-Saharan Africa was on the front burner in the early 60s, and no part of the con-Studies in Intelligence Vol. 50, No. 4 tinent was getting more attention than the Congo, which seemed to be tearing itself apart and/or going communist. At that moment, not many issues loomed larger for this country than saving the Congolese from themselves and the Soviets.
Starting with little beyond what he might have gleaned from Conrad's Heart of Darkness, Sam read everything he could find, talked with anyone who would sit still for him, and filled box after box with three-by-five cards. His phenomenal memory gave him almost total recall, and he quickly became one of Washington's reigning authorities on the Congo.
Sam's specialty was the "Simba" rebels in the eastern Congo. How much of a threat did they pose to the extraordinarily weak central government, and what was the extent of communist influence? We knew the rebels were getting help from the Cubans; Che Guevara himself turned up for a while. But what could we expect from the rebels themselves? Hiam even offers some glimmers of insight into a question that has always intrigued me: What converted Sam from a directionless Harvard undergraduate and "downwardly mobile WASP" into a driven intelligence analyst? The answer seems to have been a case of finally breaking the family mold. After a stint in the Navy, Sam followed his father's wishes and enrolled in Harvard Law School. He decided after two years, however, that the law was not for him, and Hiam says the decision led the father to "take a swing at his son." At about the same time, his girlfriend, a Wellesley graduate from a wellto-do Alabama family, to whom he had proposed marriage, discovered she was pregnant. This concatenation of occurrences, I believe, brought him over the threshold to independence. Sam and his girlfriend quickly married, Sam quit the New York banking job his father had found for him, and the couple moved to Washington to begin Sam's meteoric intelligence career. come away with a degree of sympathy for them. They clearly had no idea how to deal with the persistent attacks on this lone, irrepressible idealist.
❖ ❖ ❖
The turning point in the numbers story came with the 1967 national estimate that settled on a narrow definition of the categories to be included in our order-of-battle estimates. 5 Hiam, citing documents and interviews, makes the following case: MACV, following implicit or explicit guidance from Westmoreland himself, would not accept a number that exceeded a certain limit. The fundamental tenet of US policy was that we were wearing down the enemy-that at some not-toodistant point, the communists' attrition rates would exceed their replenishment capacity. MACV, in fact, was claiming in 1967 that we might be approaching this "crossover point." Sam's notion that communist numbers should be pegged higher by a factor of two or three was politically out of bounds by several miles. Hiam, quoting a member of Westmore- Vietnam, 1948 -1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005 and at www.cia.gov/nic. land's staff who agonized over the issue, says that at one point Westmoreland's own intelligence chief came up with a higher estimate. Westmoreland allegedly reacted by asking, "What will I tell the president? What will I tell Congress? What will be the reaction of the press to these higher numbers?" The intelligence chief was soon sent packing.
There was also a mind-set issue. Military doctrine as it had emerged from World War II and Korea focused only on regular military formations. There was no place for the guerrillas and political infrastructure that were at the heart of the numbers controversy, and at the heart of Vietnamese communist strategy as well. In his interview on "60 Minutes," Westmoreland acknowledged in essence that one of the reasons he had excluded irregulars from the order of battle was that he didn't think they were really soldiers.
MACV, Hiam continues, was adamant that it have the final say. It was not going to be second-guessed even by the Pentagon, much less by CIA civilians, and CIA was not willing to press the point. For policymakers, the US involvement in the war had begun as part of our worldwide struggle against communism, and policymakers never really came to terms with the aspects of the war that did not fit this preconception. They failed until too late, for example, to recognize the strength Hanoi gained from its standing as the embodiment of Vietnamese nationalism, and the powerful force that emerged from the welding of nationalism with communist discipline. The American can-do attitude, and the corollary that American ideals were welcome everywhere, led easily to over-optimism: surely, we could "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese and beat this ragtag bunch of communists. Moreover, we had begun our commitment in Vietnam in the shadow of the "who-lost-China" controversies of the 50s and the trauma of the Korean War, and throughout the war the political costs of defeat in Vietnam remained too high to contemplate. At the same time, policymakers were acutely aware of the political and economic pressures limiting the resources they could commit to the war. As the Pentagon Papers show, their time and attention were consumed in endless debates about how to cope with this array of unsatisfactory choices. They had little time for intelligence, especially if its message just made the choices harder.
The US military had fallen into the trap of fighting the last war. For all the lip service to "counterinsurgency," military doctrine had enormous difficulty looking beyond the main-force combat that had gained the generals their stars. Control-of territory and of population-was more important than the attitudes of ordinary Vietnamese. And just as their civilian bosses underestimated Hanoi's political staying power, the generals underestimated its ability to absorb enormous losses and keep fighting. Viet Cong numbers were far from the only thing on Helms's plate, moreover. According to Ford, Helms was simultaneously pushing a skeptical appraisal of the US bombing campaign through the system, and he was reluctant to do anything that might make his military counterparts less willing to go along with it. 14 He also had to keep his eye on the rest of the world, notably the Middle East: the Six-Day War (in which CIA analysts had acquitted themselves well) had occurred just a few months earlier. 15 Second, it seems clear that MACV's order-of-battle analysts did tailor their estimates to the needs of their consumers. According to Hiam, one lieutenant said he was told, "Lie a little, Mac. Lie a little." George Allen told Ford that the head of the MACV orderof-battle unit at the time, a hardcharging careerist who later became head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, acknowledged years afterward that "of course" there were many more Viet Cong than MACV's charts showed, but the numbers on the charts were "the command position." 16 As for CIA, Ford cites numerous occasions of skepticism among agency analysts about prospects for the war. The writers of the Pentagon Papers, too, note that CIA's analysis was often more realistic than that of others. But, 13 The incident is the second of Ford's three episodes. Op. cit., 39-80. 14 it is one thing to put forth cogent analysis and another to have an impact on policy. It was not just Helms who was convinced that taking on MACV would be suicidal. Even one of Sam's more sympathetic colleagues told Hiam, "Sam and I had a lot of slinging matches because he had his standards, some of which I knew damn well wouldn't sell."
The problem went deeper than relative bureaucratic clout. Neither Sam nor anyone else ever managed to make it clear to their bosses just why the so-called "numbers" debate was so important. It was much more than a simple matter of numbers: which Viet Cong groups you thought we should count was a function of what kind of war you thought we were fighting, and no question could be more fundamental than that. Not having grasped this point, a senior member of Carver's mission to Saigon could assert that particular numbers did not make much difference, 17 and Carver could tell Helms (in a cable from Saigon that Sam subsequently spirited to his woodland cache), "Major differences lie in realm of conceptual and presentational methodology rather than in genuine disagreement over substantive facts." 18 Carver's careful handling of the issue is particularly revealing. Carver was at least Helms's equal in bureaucratic astuteness. He had given the White House a précis of Sam's findings 17 Ford, 95. 18 Cited in Hiam, 118. (without telling Sam), and, according to Ford, he supported Sam's analysis at least through the middle of 1967. 19 The depth of his commitment is suspect, however. Ford adds that Carver "generally supported the Johnson administration's view that things were looking up." 20 Having fought the good fight in Saigon, he wound up doing what was necessary "to get this OB question off the board," as Helms wished.
Even in the best of circumstances, intelligence would have faced a monumental task had it challenged the deeply set preconceptions of the country's political and military leaders. And in intelligence matters the circumstances are never the best. Intelligence must always acknowledge a margin of uncertainty, and the uncertainty will almost always lead to disagreements that allow policymakers to push their own preferences. In the Viet Cong numbers case, the willingness, even eagerness, of MACV's orderof-battle unit to mesh its estimates with the command's perceived political imperatives probably made the task insurmountable. For this observer, it is hard to see that we have improved much in subsequent years. We still have a problem when strongly held mindsets on the policy side meet an intelligence establishment that lacks definitive information (as it nearly always does), can't achieve agreement internally, doesn't want to get too far out of line with its customers, and is conscious of the limited leverage that comes with its position near the foot of the table.
What can intelligence do? Drawing up a list of prescriptions is easy; putting them to work is a challenge. The following is my First, know all you possibly can. In particular, look beyond what everyone else is reading and supplement your reading with talking. Sam's insights came from slogging through piles of material no one else had looked at. Similarly, I have the strong impression that detailed expertise, far beyond what we are likely to learn from official sources, is more critical today than ever before on a whole range of important topics: the workings of Iran's theocracy, the place of Islamic radicalism in both the Muslim world and the West, and political dynamics in the countries of the former Soviet Union come immediately to mind. Basic area knowledge is essential but not sufficient. I am convinced that, on many firstorder topics, we cannot gain the knowledge we need without a time-consuming effort to deal directly with people who are immersed in the area of interest. This is much more easily said than done, given the mass of available information and the substantial fragment of that mass which arrives in an analyst's electronic inbox every day. Moreover, the culture often seems to push in the opposite direction: quickness may seem more highly valued than depth, and moving from one assignment to another more careerenhancing than sticking to one topic.
Sam's experience is a case in point. True, when he was working on Vietnam, the list of things he
One of many ironies in the Sam Adams story is that the Tet offensive [February 1968] rendered the argument over Viet Cong numbers irrelevant.
needed to know was narrower than it is for most analysts. However, he did exemplary work in a broader arena when he worked on the Congo, not just tracking reporting from official US sources but also studying such critical topics as the details of the country's tribal makeup. But even on the Congo, he could do this only because his superiors gave him his head. Freelancing became his standard way of operating when he moved over to Vietnam, and it is both a significant irony and a cautionary lesson for those who practice the craft of intelligence that this was both his chief strength and the main factor in his failure.
Second, understand what the traffic will bear. This precept, of course, would have outraged Sam, but it is a fact of analytic life. 24 Intelligence, a staff function, will rarely be the main topic considered by the line officials charged with making the decisions. Thoughtful use of the precepts described here may open the door a little wider, but in the end, as Gains Hawkins observed, both duty and temperament will lead policymakers to treat it as "their war to fight." What, then, does an intelligence analyst do when confronted with something as egregious as the cooking of the books at MACV? Most analysts will not face such a dilemma, but this is by no means a
